The reasons for this increased complexity are several. Some arise from basic choice-oflaw issues that are always present in international arbitrations, some from the inherent nature of IP and IP law and some from typical characteristics of an international IP commercial transaction.
First, generally speaking in international arbitrations as opposed to litigation in court, there are more jurisdictions 2 whose law could be applicable to one aspect or another of the arbitral proceedings. Also, the scope of the application of the law of the site of the arbitration can be less clear than in a court proceeding.
Secondly, there are different types of IP -patents, copyrights, trade secrets and so on.
Some have no validity except under the law of the state under which they arose, while some in "State" means an entity with a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, foreign relations with other such entities. The allocation of authority between a State and its territorial subdivisions is determined under the law of that State.
Under this definition the United States would be a State and State of the United States (e.g., New York) would be a subdivision. As this deviates somewhat from normal practice here in the United States and might be a little confusing, this article will refer to a body meeting the definition of §101(5) as a "state," one of the United States as a "State" and a body that is either a state or a State as a "jurisdiction."
The Principles do not formally apply to arbitration. However, the Reporters note that "they may be used by analogy in jurisdictions that do not have specific rules on the arbitrability of intellectual property disputes." Principles § 202 Reporters' Note 6. Accordingly, and while the Principals are not final and perhaps not without some controversy, they can provide some guidance on the general state of law. The same is certainly true of the more general, but final for many years, Restatement (2d) of Conflicts (1971) (the "Restatement"). It is therefore reasonable to use them both for statements on the general state of the law on the specific issue or issues in question, at least in those cases where there is no specific law or precedent on point; and we will be returning to both throughout this article. states there are public policy defenses to a claim that sounds in an IP right. Indeed, for example, some states make arbitration unavailable for the determination of patent validity.
Thirdly, the typical international commercial IP transaction may involve multiple forms of IP, IP arising under the laws of multiple states or both. This complication is often ignored at the drafting stage as it is not unusual for the parties to choose the law of only one jurisdiction for the choice-of-law provision and that jurisdiction may even be one under which none of the IP in question arises. 3 And if the reader think that these issues are more academic rather than real, it is useful to consider the following not atypical international IP transaction: a license 4 of computer hardware and software technology from a Massachusetts company to a Japanese company for the making of a product in Japan to be sold in Asia. The IP rights of the Massachusetts licensor would include a copyright in the software, trade secrets in at least the source code of the software and perhaps in manufacturing techniques in the hardware and United States and foreign counterpart patents in the hardware and perhaps the software. While licensors usually can impose both the jurisdiction of the choice-of-law clause and the seat for the arbitration, sometimes licensees are able to bargain for what they perceive as more neutral law and a less unequally convenient arbitration location. In this case, the choice-of-law provision might reference New York law and the arbitral forum might be San Francisco. In any event, in this author's experience, most parties do not expressly provide for choice of any law other than the substantial law of the contract.
In a dispute over this hypothetical transaction, note:
1) The dispute involves an international agreement involving IP.
2) The parties are from two different states.
3) The rights licensed include patents, trade secrets and copyrights.
4) The license grant covers IP rights of multiple states.
5) The license has a choice-of-law provision which provides for the application 
II. GENERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The first step in the analysis of the interplay of choice-of-law and IP issues in international arbitrations is a review of the general choice-of-law principles applicable in such arbitrations. 6 However, a true international analysis, considering, for example, various states as the arbitral location or seat, and thus various lex arbitri, is well beyond the scope of this article.
Accordingly, while the discussion in this article will be as universal as possible, most cited law, 6 At some point, and this is as good as any, one needs to confront the question as to whether arbitral tribunals are bound to follow any of the choice-of-law principles discussed in this article and whether a party has a remedy for a tribunal's failure to do so. Neither the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § § 1-16 (the "Act"), Cir. 2004 ) ("Under the New York Convention, the rulings of the Tribunal interpreting the parties' contract are entitled to deference. Unless the Tribunal manifestly disregarded the parties' agreement or the law, there is no basis to set aside the determination that Swiss procedural law applied." (footnotes omitted)). Nevertheless, in the experience of this author, most tribunals attempt to follow applicable law. And this article will assume such for the issues under consider in it.
will, of necessity, assume that the arbitral site is in the United States and that the arbitration is therefore between a United States entity and foreign entity.
At least five states' laws may be applicable in any particular international arbitration.
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These are: (a) the laws of jurisdiction or jurisdictions governing the parties' ability to agree to arbitrate, (b) the law of the jurisdiction governing the agreement to arbitrate, (c) the law of the arbitral forum, (d) the law of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions where the award will be recognized and enforced and (e) the substantive law of the contract. 8 In addition, the rules of the administering body, if there is one, may also have an impact. 9 Let us consider each in turn. There is also an overarching question -which we will return to in part II(c), supra -of whether the parties can avoid the application of a law of the seat of the arbitration by use of a choice-oflaw provision in the arbitration clause, specifically, or in the contract's choice-of-law provision, in the more general case.
Whatever may be the pros and cons of a separate choice-of-law provision for the arbitration clause, in its absence the law governing the arbitration clause will generally be the same as that which governs the contract as a whole. Since most international IP agreements will usually contain a choice-of-law provision for substantive law but no separate choice-of-law to briefly consider whether they should apply at all. In a typical international arbitration, the site of the arbitration might be chosen for no better reason than that it was a neutral location (i.e., not the home state of either party) which either was equally convenient, or inconvenient, to both parties or was simply just a "good" place in which to stay during the hearings. Note also that the hearings themselves could be in multiple locations and states. 14 Finally, in some international arbitrations, the parties leave the choice of the location of the hearings to the arbitral tribunal's decision. For these and other reasons, many have argued that the choice of the seat of the arbitration should have no effect on the laws to be applied in the proceedings. -the validity and form of the arbitration agreement; -arbitrability; -the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; -the appointment, removal and replacement of arbitrators; -challenge of arbitrators; -time limits; -the conduct of the arbitration, including possible rules for the disclosure of documents; -interim measures of protection; -whether there is power to consolidate arbitrations; -whether the arbitral tribunal is able to decide ex aequo et bono; -the form and validity of the arbitral award; and -the finality of the award (including any right of recourse against it under national law).
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It takes only a cursory glance at this list to see that all of the items in it appear explicitly to be only issues of "procedure" 23 rather than those going to the substance of the matters in dispute, although implicitly one or two (i.e., the jurisdiction of the arbitrators and the form and validity of the arbitral award) could be argued to reach some substantive issues. The question flowing from this distinction which is relevant to the topics under consideration in this article is then: to what extent must or should or can an arbitral tribunal consider the substantive laws of the seat of the arbitration if the choice-of-law clause in the contract points to the laws of another jurisdiction.
24 22 Redfern and Hunter p. 95. 23 There is, of course, one other source of procedural rules that is applicable, the arbitration rules of the administering body, assuming there is one, or whatever rules the parties adopt in an ad hoc arbitration. 24 Note for this part of the analysis it will be assumed that the seat is not the state whose laws would be pertinent if the parties had not elected any choice-of-law provision or if they could not chose an alternative state for the Or, to put it more precisely in terms of an IP related arbitration, should the arbitral tribunal consider the seat's laws relating to the validity and enforcement of IP? 25 And does it make a difference if the seat's law in question relates to public policy since public policy issues have a special significance, both under the New York Convention and United States arbitration law. 26 However, note that both the New York Convention provision and the public policy particular issue in question under the principles discussed in part II(e), infra. In either of those cases, the analysis reduces to that in part II(e) as the seat is the substantive law state as well. One example of such circumstances in an IP arbitration might arise if some or all of the IP in question was seat state IP. 25 Actually there are several different possible scenarios, depending on the state whose law is applicable to the IP, the jurisdiction chosen in the choice-of-law forum and the identity of the seat. No separate choice-of-law issue relating to the lex arbitri is presented if the later two or the first and third are the same. On the other hand at the other extreme, the tribunal will be likely forced to decide the applicability of the seat's substantive law if all three are different. For example, assume the seat has some law which affects the enforceability of the IP in question if it had been IP issued by the seat. Assume also, however, that the IP was issued by a state other then the seat and that the choice-of-law clause points to yet another jurisdiction. Is the tribunal required to take that law of the seat into account in deciding whether or not the IP is valid and enforceable? In other words, does a tribunal sitting in New York need to take United States IP law into account in deciding the validity and enforceability of French IP licensed to a United States entity by a Japanese entity under a license with a Japanese choice-of-law provision?
26 Under the New York Convention, the only substantive grounds for which an award can be denied enforcement are in Article V(2) which provides:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.
There is no comparable provision under the Act, but the courts have fashioned a public policy grounds for nonenforcement. Cir. 1993 ). However, the public policy is only available as grounds for reversal if it is both "explicit" and "well defined and dominant… ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents." Id. grounds adopted by the United States courts apply to the enforcement of an award and are thus more to the point with respect to the impact of the law of the enforcement jurisdiction rather than that of the seat. 27 This distinction is not without some significance as it can be expected that, except in case of enforcement proceedings (or similar vacatur proceedings), pertinent court decisions on the appropriate substantive scope of the lex arbitri will be rare, if they exist at all. This can be seen from the following: If you assume that nearly all court actions regarding an arbitral award are in enforcement or vacatur proceedings, then either the state of enforcement will be the same as the seat or it will not be. In the first situation, any lex arbitri public policy grounds for denial of enforcement will be found in the law of the enforcing state as well since the two states are the same. In the second situation, it can be presumed that a court of one state would be reluctant to deny enforcement to an arbitral award based upon a public policy of another state whose policy did not exist in the enforcing state. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a little guidance on the issue in United States court decisions.
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(e) recognition or enforcement would be repugnant to the public policy in the State in which enforcement is sought; and the Reporters' Notes to that section: "Given these other avenues for addressing policy concerns, subsection (e), which echoes provisions of other instruments [citations omitted] should be reserved for cases where enforcing the judgment would cause extreme--manifest--incompatibility problems. 27 Id. 28 A Westlaw search of all federal case for the term "lex arbitri" turned up only 5 "hits" of which 4 were different stages of the same case. One of those decisions did involve a public policy defense to the enforcement of the award, but the public policy was that of the enforcing state not the lex arbitri. Karaha international arbitration is restricted to procedural matters. 30 The Principles are also explicit, at least for matters that do not rise to the level of public policy. Section 301 on territoriality provides in pertinent part (emphasis and footnotes added):
(1) Except as provided in § § 302 and 321-323 31 , the law applicable to determine the existence, validity, duration, attributes, and infringement of intellectual property rights and the remedies for their infringement is: … (b) for other intellectual property rights, the law of each State for which protection is sought. 29 
U.S. 614 (1985).
30 E.g., Redfern and Hunter p. 95. 31 Section 302 provides that the parties' choice-of-law clause should be given effect except for matters such as "(a) the validity and maintenance of registered rights; (b) the existence, attributes, transferability, and duration of rights, whether or not registered; and (c) formal requirements for recordation of assignments and licenses." Section 321 deals with the situation of infringing activity in multiple jurisdictions, and is discussed further in part II (e), infra. Section 322 deals with issues of public policy and is discussed immediately following the text to which this footnote applies. Section 223 deals with mandatory laws and provides:
The court may give effect to the mandatory rules of any State with which the dispute has a close connection if, under that State's law, the rules must apply regardless of the law that is otherwise applicable.
To the extent there is any doubt in the language that the Principles do not intend that the forum state may generally apply its own substantive law, that doubt is dispelled in the Reporters' Notes.
32 Finally, at least the rules of some of administering bodies are consistent with the view that only procedural law of the seat should be considered by the Tribunal.
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On the other hand, there is support for the contrary view in the previously cited dictum in footnote 13 in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
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Under some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of that place to apply to that transaction.
There is also dictum that is arguably to a similar effect in one of the opinions in Karaha Bodas Characterization of connecting factors. The international conventions on intellectual property, when applicable, do not characterize with certainty the connecting factor or factors, nor do they, as a general matter, clearly set forth a choice-of-law approach. For example, although art. 5(2) of the Berne Convention states that "the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed," many scholars contend that art. 5(2) of the Berne Convention should not be construed as a rule on conflicts of law.
[citations omitted]
Article 5(2), moreover, is unclear as to the precise characterization of the connecting factor, i.e., "where protection is claimed," especially when the infringement is committed on the Internet, and also as to the exact scope of the applicable law. For example, the reference to the country "where" protection is claimed could mean the substantive or the conflicts law of the forum State, or it could mean the substantive law of the country (or countries) "for which" protection is claimed. As an example, suppose a copyrightinfringement suit brought in the United States regarding an unauthorized transmission from Canada of a U.S. work, received in France. " [T] he country where protection is claimed" in this instance might mean the lex loci delicti, which, in turn, might mean the place(s) of commission/initiation of the infringement (Canada), or the place(s) of its impact (France). Alternatively, "where protection is claimed" might mean the lex fori, the law of the forum State where the action is brought (the United States). In other words, even if the Berne Convention purported to announce choice-of-law rules, the disagreement as to what those rules are counsels clear enunciation of choice-of-law rules in these Principles.
Art. 9 of the European Commission's Amended Rome II Proposal designates that for intellectual property rights other than a "unitary Community industrial property right," "the law of the country for which protection is sought" controls infringement (emphasis added). The same approach is taken here. By allowing concurrent enforcement and annulment actions, as well as simultaneous enforcement actions in third countries, the Convention necessarily envisions multiple proceedings that address the same substantive challenges to an arbitral award. For instance, Article (V)(1)(d) enables a losing party to challenge enforcement on the grounds that the arbitral panel did not obey the law of the arbitral situs, i.e., the lex arbitri, even though such a claim would undoubtedly be raised in annulment proceedings in the rendering State itself. In addition, this case illustrates that enforcement proceedings in multiple secondary-jurisdiction states can address the same substantive issues. 36 And § 322 of the Principles on the impact of public policy provides:
The application of particular rules of foreign law is excluded if such application leads to a result in the forum State that is repugnant to the public policy in that State. 37 Finally, at least one rule of one administering body would support this more expansive view. 38 Where then does that leave us? Perhaps the best that can be said is that a tribunal probably may apply the substantive law of the seat of the arbitration, unless either (i) the parties have chosen another jurisdiction's laws and the matter is one on which they can make such a choice 39 or (ii) another jurisdiction's law must be applied. 40 If the matter is one of public policy, the argument for applying the seat's law is stronger and may even trump the parties' choice of 35 The identity of this jurisdiction -or jurisdictions -is, of course, somewhat of a wild card.
To be sure one or more of them could, probably will, be one or more of the jurisdictions identified in part II (a), supra, namely the respective states of organization or locations of the principal places of business or residences of the parties. But a jurisdiction where enforcement may be sought could just as well be some other jurisdiction where, for example, one of the patents under dispute was issued. In fact, an international patent agreement may license a master patent (issued, for example, in the United States) and corresponding patents issued in a number of countries around the world and the number of possible enforcement jurisdictions may be significant. Even more numerous are the possible enforcement jurisdictions for a worldwide 41 An example of this might arise under a law such as the regulations in the United States that govern export control. E.g., 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774. Not only do those regulations cover direct export from the United States of covered technology, they also pertain to shipment of the technology from one foreign country to another. 15 C.F.R. § 730.5. Consider then an arbitration in the United States between two foreign entities over a transaction in yet another country which, if it takes place, would violate those "re-export" regulations. If part of the relief the claimant is requesting is an order compelling that the respondent complete the transaction, should, or could, the tribunal grant it?
42 New York Convention Article V(2). 43 See note 26, supra.
44 Principles §322.
copyright license. Since a copyright issued in one Berne treaty country is valid in all, 45 an award relating to an international copyright license may well be subject to enforcement in well over 100 countries.
Should or must, a tribunal take the law of these jurisdictions into account in its award?
Can it? The tribunal could be faced with either an insurmountably large task or the danger that the award might be a nullity or both. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is some difference of opinion in the literature as to whether in the general case a tribunal has a duty to ensure that an award is in fact enforceable, at least in the jurisdiction in which it will likely be enforced is different from the seat of the arbitration or the jurisdiction whose laws were chosen, either by the parties or the tribunal, as the substantive ones applicable to the dispute. 46 Again, there is no easy answer and again the best that can be done is to draw some general conclusions. Certainly nothing would seem to prevent the arbitral tribunal from taking into account the law of a jurisdiction in which the award may be enforced. Whether it should or must do so in all likelihood must depend on the specific circumstances in the arbitration in impossible, for any tribunal to consider whether its award would be enforceable in all jurisdictions in which such enforcement might be sought.
(e) The Substantive Law of the Contract
There is wide agreement that the parties have substantial latitude to choose the substantive law that is applicable to their contract, at least certainly on matters to which they could have contracted, 48 and that, in the absence of such a choice-of-law selection by the parties, 48 Many jurisdictions follow the rule that a contractual choice-of-law provision can only pertain to those aspects of a contract about which the parties could have contracted. In those jurisdictions, matters such as capacity to contract, adhesion and other issues relating to the legality cannot be the subject of a choice-of-law provision. See Restatement §187, which provides:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. …
See also Principles § 302 which provides (emphasis added):
Agreements Pertaining To Choice Of Law (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Section, the parties may agree at any time, including after a dispute arises, to designate a law that will govern all or part of their dispute.
(2) The parties may not choose the law that will govern the following issues: Nothing prevents patent-related disputes such as this one from being resolved in binding foreign arbitration. As with other property rights, patent-related rights can be contracted away. [citation omitted] Parties may agree to arbitrate patent infringement and validity issues, and such agreements bind the parties. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2000) ("A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or infringement arising under the contract.... Any such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract."). Section 294 is not limited to domestic arbitration, nor is there any compelling reason to so interpret its authorization of the arbitration of disputes over patent-related rights. In Mitsubishi Motors, the Supreme Court held enforceable an agreement to resolve an antitrust claim by foreign arbitration. Id. at 640, 105 S.Ct. 3346. The Court explained that international comity, respect for foreign tribunals, and the commercial system's need for predictable dispute resolution required holding the plaintiff to its agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 629, 105 S.Ct. 3346. These concerns apply with vital force to the resolution of disputes regarding patent rights.
[The licensee] contends that, notwithstanding the arbitration clause in its agreement, it should not be bound to arbitrate. This is so, it maintains, because the Canadian arbitration proceedings may apply Canadian law to the issue of the validity of the ′164 patent, and Canadian law may estop DAHI, as a licensee, from challenging the patent's validity. In Mitsubishi Motors, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument. Id. at 636, 105 S.Ct. 3346. … Likewise, we see no reason to presume that the Canadian arbitral panel will apply Canadian law to determine the validity of the United States patent. In fact, it is uncertain whether the issue of validity necessarily falls within the scope of what the parties agreed to arbitrate. That is an issue for the Canadian courts to determine, at least in the first instance.
Because the agreement contains a broad arbitration clause, and because the present dispute including [licensee's] allegations of noninfringement and invalidity arose from [licensor's] July 28, 2000 letter contending that the sale of Anipryl is subject to the license agreement, considerations of international comity demand that the district court stay proceedings in the present litigation pending the outcome of the Canadian arbitration. Should the Canadian court determine that either the noninfringement or invalidity issues fall outside the scope of the arbitration clause, the district court may address them at that time. We express no view as to whether the decision of the Canadian court regarding arbitrability will be binding in the district court proceedings. Does the Deprenyl case actually stand for the principle that the parties have the power to elect that the validity of a United States patent be decided not just by arbitration, but also by arbitration in accordance with the substantive laws of another state? As will be discussed below it is clear that, at least in the United States, one may arbitrate issues regarding United States patents. 55 But the view 56 that the court held that the parties may choose foreign law to apply to the issue of the validity of a United States patent in that arbitration is, it is submitted, more than the court intended.
First, as a practical matter, to the extent the language in question can be so interpreted, it is dictum. Second, the court itself recognizes the difficulty of applying foreign law to the question of the validity of a United States patent and notes that it would be speculative to assume that the arbitration tribunal would do so. 57 Third, the grounds under both the New York Convention 58 and the Act 59 to refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate (as opposed to the grounds to refuse to enforce an arbitral award) are limited and do not include the possibility that the arbitral tribunal may make a finding or issue an award that is incorrect or even that is contrary to public policy. The public policy argument, if it is raised at all, must be raised in the proceeding to enforce the award. It is thus reasonable to assume that the appropriate approach is that contained in the §187 of the Restatement or the various applicable provisions of the Principles or both. Having thus concluded that the parties' ability to choose the applicable law is not without limit, and by extension considered the circumstances when such limitation might apply, the remaining question is what the factors determine the identity of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions whose laws would either (i) trump a choice-of-law clause or (ii) apply in the absence of such a clause.
It should be noted that the two (i.e., a jurisdiction whose laws may trump a parties'
choice-of-law selection and a jurisdiction whose law applies in the absence of such a selection)
are not, or may not be, the same. In the absence of a contractual choice-of-law clause, most courts in the United States would employ the traditional most significant relationship analysis to determine which substantive law governed the contract. 64 More specifically, the most significant relationship analysis considers the applicability of the laws of a number of jurisdictions 61 At least twice the court notes that the issue of the scope of the arbitration clause is "for the Canadian courts to determine, at least in the first instance." Deprenyl at 1358 (emphasis added 
(f) The Rules of the Administering Body
The rules of an arbitral administering body are not technically speaking "law" which is applicable to the parties' agreement or the resolution of the parties' dispute. Rather they are additional contract terms which are incorporated into the parties' arbitration provision if and when the parties make reference to them. 68 In addition, it is to be expected that the rules of most of these bodies will be general in nature and not specific to the issue of choice-of-law in IP disputes. Finally, it is not practical to consider every administrating body.
Nevertheless, there is reasonable consistency among the bodies' rules on matters which do have some bearing on the issues under consideration. Thus the rules do provide some guidance that is instruction for us. In particular, the rules as a general matter typically require a tribunal (i) to apply the rules, themselves, unless in conflict with the laws of the seat of the arbitration and (ii) to respect the parties' choice-of-law provision, if there is one, and, in the absence of such a clause give the tribunal substantial latitude to apply the law of the jurisdiction it thinks is most appropriate.
For example, with respect to the first issue the International Rules of the AAA provide:
These Rules govern the arbitration, except that, where any such rule is in conflict with any provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail. The proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal shall be governed by these Rules and, where these Rules are silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the Arbitral Tribunal may settle on, whether or not reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the arbitration. ICC Rules of Arbitration, Article 15(1).
See also Appendix II to the ICC Rules of Arbitration, Article 6, quoted at length in note supra.
While those of the London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA") provide:
The law applicable to the arbitration (if any) shall be the arbitration law of the seat of arbitration, unless and to the extent that the parties have expressly agreed in writing on the application of another arbitration law and such agreement is not prohibited by the law of the arbitral seat. LCIA Arbitration Rules, Article 16.3.
Finally, the rules promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), rules which are frequently used in ad hoc arbitrations, provide:
These Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 1 (2).
specific issue or on whether and to what extent the tribunal must assure that the award will be enforceable in other jurisdictions. In addition to the law that created the IP right in question, other laws affect that right's validity and enforceability. These include laws that may govern the attributes, transferability 84 and duration of the right and the recordation of contracts pertaining to the right. The parties may have limited or no ability to choose the jurisdiction whose law would govern many or most of these issues. 85 In addition, there are other laws which go to the use or licensing of IP or which are defenses to claims of infringement. 86 And unlike the usual commercial contract, IP disputes may, and often do involve, public policy concerns such as antitrust issues. 87 At first glance this consideration may seem clear cut: as with the issue of validity, it makes the most sense to decide these issues under the law of the state which issued the IP in question. But there are at least two "exceptions" which make this general rule open to question.
III. ADDITONAL IP-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
First, as discussed previously, 88 there may be public policy issues of the arbitral seat that could affect whether or not a contract pertaining to foreign IP should be enforced. Second and generally, whether or not these concerns should affect the choice-of-law analysis may well depend on the concern in question. At least in the international context, the parties may be able to choose foreign law to avoid the application of United States antitrust or misuse law. 89 On the other hand, should the parties be able to use a choice-of-law clause to avoid the application of a Yet it would be rare for an agreement to provide for more than one applicable law in the choice-of-law clause. Inevitably it is unlikely that a single jurisdiction's laws will be appropriate to deal with all of this complexity.
(e) The Level of the Jurisdiction
The laws pertaining to IP are often at a different level of jurisdiction than those the parties point to in the choice-of-law clause. In other words, in the context of a contract involving only United States parties and issues, the choice-of-law provision will typically point to a State (such as New York or California), yet many IP issues are federal in nature and can only be 90 See note 84, supra.
91 Typically industry practice is to license object code (machine readable code) under a copyright license and source code (human understandable code), if at all, as a trade secret. 92 For example, computer software inventions are patentable in the United States but not in the countries of the European Union.
resolved by reference to federal law. The same is true in some other countries such as Canada and, to a lesser extent, in the European Union.
In the case, for example, of a multi-state patent license whose choice-of-law provision references the laws of one of the States of the United States, three issues are presented: (i) did the parties intend to incorporate federal level concepts such as misuse with respect to both United States and foreign patents, (ii) can they do so and (iii) what should be done in the absence of such an understanding? With respect to the first, it would be surprising to find that the parties had even thought about this level of problem, let alone formed any kind of agreement on it. The second is thus academic. Finally, there is no general answer to the third as it depends on many factors such as the nature of the law in question, the identity of the seat of the arbitration and so on.
IV. CONCLUSION
While there may be some rules of application that are useful in analyzing choice-of-law issues in international IP arbitrations, many of these issues cannot be resolved by reference to a general set of rules. In these situations, the good sense of the tribunal will be necessary to balance what may be conflicting considerations to reach an outcome that is fair, reflects as much as possible the parties' intent and works logically within the framework of the law of the various jurisdictions whose IP may be at issue in the arbitration.
